McLaughlin identified China, Germany, and Japan as being prime offenders in the global economic meltdown. Their “offense” was that they ran persistent trade surpluses, had savings rates that were “far too high” and consumption rates that were “far too low.” ...
In the first place, if the creditor nations of the world actually follow Mr. McLaughlin’s advice and become borrowers themselves, from just where does Mr. McLaughlin believe the money will come? These countries already lend to America. Does he think that they also have enough leftover to lend to themselves? Does he believe that America, which is tens of trillions of dollars in debt, has enough excess savings to lend? Perhaps he’s eyeing the Martians’ accumulated savings? The point is: the entire world cannot borrow at the same time. Someone has to do the lending. The only reason Americans are able to borrow so much is that those “offending nations” are loaning us the money.
Mr. McLaughlin apparently believes that if those countries simply adopted policies to encourage more consumption, America would then be able to export more products. Just what American-made products does he expect the Chinese to buy? If China did spend more, which they ultimately will, they would simply buy more of their own products that they currently ship to us. After all, if Americans are not buying American-made products, why would the Chinese? In most cases, it’s not that consumers do not want to buy American products: it’s just that there are so few American-made products that are competitive in the global marketplace.
If Americans are not buying American...
The global downturn didn't begin in the US
AT the recent meeting of G-20 nations in London, officials from many nations agreed on one thing -- that the United States is to blame for the world recession. President Obama agreed, speaking in Strasbourg of "the reckless speculation of bankers that has now fueled a global economic downturn." One problem with this blame-game is that last year's recession was much deeper in many European and Asian countries than it was in the United States....most of the economies that fell first and fastest were not heavily dependent on exports to the United States....
...What did all the contracting economies have in common? Not all had housing booms -- certainly not Canada, Japan, Sweden or the other countries at the bottom of the economic-growth list. What really triggered this recession should be obvious, since the same thing happened before every other postwar US recession save one (1960).
In 1983, economist James Hamilton of the University of California at San Diego showed that "all but one of the US recessions since World War Two have been preceded, typically with a lag of around three-fourths of a year, by a dramatic increase in the price of crude petroleum." The years 1946 to 2007 saw 10 dramatic spikes in the price of oil -- each of which was soon followed by recession.......In a new paper at cato.org, "Financial Crisis and Public Policy," Jagadeesh Gokhale notes that the prolonged decline in exurban housing construction that began in early 2006 was a logical response to rising prices of oil and gasoline at that time. So was the equally prolonged decline in sales of gas-guzzling vehicles. And the US/UK financial crises in the fall of 2008 were likewise as much a consequence of recession as the cause: Recessions turn good loans into bad. The recession began in late 2007 or early 2008 in many countries, with the United States one of the least affected. Countries with the deepest recessions have no believable connection to US housing or banking problems. The truth is much simpler: There is no way the oil-importing economies could have kept humming along with oil prices of $100 a barrel, much less $145. Like nearly every other recession of the postwar period, this one was triggered by a literally unbearable increase in the price of oil.
Bernanke's "bailout reflationary bubble"
"The financial community is donating more to Democrats than ever before and you've got more Democrats in the financial community, creating a very powerful pattern there. I don't think you're going to see the Obama administration and Congress willing to be tough enough in dealing with these things."...
A year ago, he warned of a the pending explosion of a 25-year "multibubble" that started in the 1980s, when the financial sector accounted for 10 percent to 12 percent of the U.S. economy had started metastasizing into an "arguably crippling" 20 percent to 21 percent by the middle of this decade.
Overleveraging and easy credit was bound to create disaster, he warned.
Phillips assigns much of the blame to former U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson, but perhaps even more on Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, who he calls a "disaster," and his predecessor, Alan Greenspan.Phillips calls Paulson a Wall Street insider who was looking out for his own, and Bernanke an academic misguidedly trying to refight the 1930s Great Depression. Together they formed the wrong team at the wrong time whose ad hoc approach threw away hundreds of billions of dollars and more than doubled the Fed's balance sheet, he says.
"What you're seeing Bernanke do is he's trying to create a bailout reflationary bubble, which he can't describe as a bubble, just as Greenspan couldn't describe the housing mortgage bubble as a bubble. What we're seeing by Bernanke is a covert attempt to rebubble," Phillips told Reuters.
Moreover, a commodities cycle probably started early in this decade and is only being masked now by recession, Phillips says, presaging a repeat 1970s style inflation, he said.
"The danger is that the great unwind -- the unraveling of the mammoth buildup of debt -- is under way. If that predominates, Bernanke's theory is you're going to have deflation," Phillips said.
"My theory is that if we are in a commodities cycle, what you will get will be more like 1973-74-75 ... where as soon as the recovery begins you get rising inflation because you're going to play havoc with all money supply and liquidity that's been unleashed " he added.
Going Broke by Degree...
The dramatic rise in university tuition costs is placing a greater financial burden on millions of college-bound Americans and their families. Yet only a fraction of the additional money colleges are collecting—twenty-one cents on the dollar—goes toward instruction. And, by many measures, colleges are doing a worse job of educating Americans. Why are we spending more—and getting less? In Going Broke by Degree, economist Richard Vedder examines the causes of the college tuition crisis. He warns that exorbitant tuition hikes are not sustainable, and explores ways to reverse this alarming trend....
America’s universities have become less productive, less efficient, and more likely to use tuition money and state and federal grants to subsidize noninstructional activities such as athletics. These factors combine to produce dramatic hikes in tuition, making it more difficult for Americans to afford college.
The traditional argument for government subsidies is that a college education provides not only the private benefit of a higher income and a more abundant life but also the social benefit of a more productive and educated citizenry. Maybe, but Mr. Vedder ingeniously shows that the states that have spent the most on higher education in the past 25 years have experienced the least economic growth.
Will bailouts lead to U.S. Treasury default?
The most dangerous consequence of federal bailouts is growing market anxiety about an eventual Treasury default, raising the specter of potentially fatal damage to the credit of the U.S. Treasury. “Including the Fed’s commitment yesterday to buy $1.15 trillion in additional bonds, the U.S. government has now spent, loaned, guaranteed or committed an astronomical sum of $12.7 trillion in an all-out attempt to bail out failing companies, save Wall Street from a financial meltdown, and prevent an economic disaster,” said Dr. Weiss. “Yet, despite these Herculean efforts, American households have already lost $12.9 trillion in wealth, millions are losing their jobs, and, despite short-lived stock market rallies, the economy is sinking into a depression.” The debt crisis is much greater than the government has reported, according to the white paper. The FDIC’s “Problem List” of troubled banks includes 252 institutions with assets of $159 billion. An analysis by Weiss Research, however, shows that a total of 1,568 banks and thrifts are at risk of failure with assets of $2.32 trillion due to weak capital, asset quality, earnings and other factors. In addition, four large U.S. banks have credit exposure related to their derivatives trading that exceeds their capital, with two in particular — Citigroup and JPMorgan Chase — taking especially large risks.
Clinton on the repeal of Glass-Steagall
BW:Mr. President, in 1999 you signed a bill essentially rolling back Glass-Steagall and deregulating banking. In light of what has gone on, do you
regret that decision?Clinton:No, because it wasn't a complete deregulation at all. We still have heavy regulations and insurance on bank deposits, requirements on banks for capital and for disclosure. I thought at the time that it might lead to more stable investments and a reduced pressure on Wall Street to produce quarterly profits that were always bigger than the previous quarter. But I have really thought about this a lot. I don't see that signing that bill had anything to do with the current crisis. Indeed, one of the things that has helped stabilize the current situation as much as it has is the purchase of Merrill Lynch (MER) by Bank of America (BAC), which was much smoother than it would have been if I hadn't signed that bill.
BW:Phil Gramm, who was then the head of the Senate Banking Committee and until recently a close economic adviser of Senator McCain, was a fierce proponent of banking deregulation. Did he sell you a bill of goods?
Clinton: Not on this bill I don't think he did. You know, Phil Gramm and I disagreed on a lot of things, but he can't possibly be wrong about everything. On the Glass-Steagall thing, like I said, if you could demonstrate to me that it was a mistake, I'd be glad to look at the evidence. But I can't blame [the Republicans]. This wasn't something they forced me into. I really believed that given the level of oversight of banks and their ability to have more patient capital, if you made it possible for [commercial banks] to go into the investment banking business as Continental European investment banks could always do, that it might give us a more stable source of long-term investment.